Hezbollah on Syria: Manipulating Both Shiites and Sunnis

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Did Hezbollah's three years of war experience in Syria improve its combat capabilities but also drain it?
 
Hezbollah’s constant brag about alleged improved combat abilities due to the terror entity’s interference in and occupation of Syria are meant for primarily propaganda purposes. Hezbollah’s war capabilities were already excellent prior to the Syrian civil war. Indeed, the 2006 War between Israel and Hezbollah clearly demonstrated the latter’s superb combat prowess.
 
Moreover, one must not separate Hezbollah from Iran -- historically a major world power -- for they are organically-linked. Iranian commanders are already highly experienced with large deployments and siege warfare. These same commanders can and do lead Hezbollah combat formations in Lebanon and Syria. The presence of high-ranking Iranian Pasdaran (Guard; a metonym for ​Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution, or IRGC) officers along with Hezbollah cadres was highlighted on January 18, 2015, when Israel attacked a joint Pasdaran-Hezbollah leadership convoy in Mazraat Amal, near Quneitra, Syria. The attack resulted in the killing of several high profile Hezbollah members as well as IRGC Brigadier General  Mohammad Ali Allahdadi.
 
The intent of Hezbollah propagandists is to keep their entity’s Shiite embracing environment in Lebanon emotionally charged and attempt to convince former and any remaining Sunni-Arab supporters that combat in Syria provides the war skills necessary to inevitably defeat Israel and, in the words of Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, conquer “Galilee and beyond Galilee.”
 
Shiite communities are historically inherently conditioned to tolerate very heavy losses to both lives and properties, for the suffering and sacrifices of Ahlulbayt (the Household of Prophet Muhammad), particularly the Third Infallible Imam, al-Husayn ibn Ali, in Karbala, Iraq, are remembered by many Shiites on daily basis.